This will be a series of blog posts that I am writing to assist me in the work of developing my book. Basically, I want to engage in a critical analysis, as it pertains to my interest in civics and citizenship education, of some of the key scholars in a range of different fields. I will be aiming to describe their arguments, the relevance of those arguments to my work, and any differing points of view related to the work in question.
This section, on Zeynap Tufekci’s book Twitter and Teargas will be relevant to Chapter Three: The organizing potential of networks and social media: challenges and opportunities.
One of the key questions for scholars exploring the field of social movements in the 21st century – and I am deliberately taking a broad definition of what might be considered a social movement – is the role that social media has played in the formation, development and success of these social movements. While originally there was much enthusiasm for the power of the internet, and then social media, as a democratising tool for the internet that was going to boost participation and civic engagement, more recent analysis has suggested that the role played by social media in this field is more complex, and more contested. It is also, and importantly, a changing field – something that Zeynap Tufekci (2017) is quick to point out.
Tufekci (2017) takes the popular uprising in Egypt in 2011 as an example of a modern social movement, and explores in some detail the successes and failures of such movements. In doing so, she describes both the strengths of this new brand of civic action, but also identifies both the weaknesses and the ways that governments and other authoritarian figures are already adapting to challenge the perceived risk presented by social-media enabled activism.
In the 2000s, many people around the world, and particularly young people, felt enthusiastic and optimistic about the opportunities provided by new technologies such as digital and social media. Tufekci describes these opportunities in terms of affordances (thought this term has a much older history than Tufekci) – that is, the actions that a given technology facilitates or makes possible. She goes on to say that social media’s capacities could be used for other purpose than solely socializing, and such an approach develops the repertoire of protest available to activists. She describes how the internet allowed networked move to to grow dramatically and rapidly, without the need for developing formal or informal organisation hierarchies or structures, which, in turn, can lead to challenges for social movements when they face determined opposition or resistance.
Central to this notion is the concept of a networked public. Importantly, Tufekci is quick to point out that what is happening in social media is not entirely new. Tufekci points out that there are cultural and political roots to community and organisng that predate the internet. However, she argues that they ‘found fuller expression in conjunction with the capabilities provided by the technology’ (p. XXXX). This is one of the central arguments about the role of social media in social movement organizations – whether social media simply increases the scale and scope of the reach of users, or whether there is a qualitative difference in the way that social media allows activists to engage with the public. It’s an idea that I will discuss further later int his chapter (XXXX).
Tufekci builds further on Benedict Anderson’s (XXXX) notion of imagined communities by expanding that definition to include the role of social media instead of solely mass media. In doing so, she is quick to point out that any discussion of the public sphere (and even that concept is open to interpretation and critique – see Papacharissi (XXXX)) is intertwined with power relations, social structures and technologies. Indeed, the structure and construction of these technologies influences these power relations; that is, the technologies that we use, including social media, shape our perception and understanding of the public sphere. Tufekci describes this as the way that technologies affect the ‘contours’ (XXXX) of public spheres, which affects social norms and political structures.
The key affordance of social media, for Tufekci, is that it allows for digital connectivity. Social movements require large number of people to be involved; indeed, many of the mechanisms in the repertoire of social movement activism carry weight solely by their size – for example, boycotts, protest and petitions. Digital connectivity makes it easier to assemble large groups of people. Tufekci is correct to point out that while these initial ‘gatherings’ might simply be in an online space – for example, the number of people who clicked like on a campaign page – it is foolish to only consider that they are limited in that way. (This is something that Earl and Kimport (2011) have explored in detail, examining the way different actors in civil society have made use of social media and digital technology in a variety of ways – e-tactics, e-mobilization and e-movements). Rather, there is complex nexus of causality and connection between online and offline activism.
In referring specifically to the anti-Mubarak protests in Egypt in 2011, Tufekci identifies a number of ways that the affordances of digital technology provided advantages over traditional forms of protest. Many of these advantages are based on the fact that leadership and organisation was able to be distributed much more widely than in previous protests. This was especially important in challenging the authoritarian regime; there were no obvious figureheads that government forces could target, which made it much more difficult to stamp out the protest movements.
While such approaches to resistance are not new, digital tools made it much easier to organise in this way. Tufekci describes this as a horizontal adhocracy and cites tools and platforms such as Twitter as good examples of the way that digital technology affordances provide the capabilities to organise in this way. In doing so, she refers to the concept of smart mobs (Rheingold 2004).
Tufekci’s analysis is broader than simply Egypt. She goes to great lengths to point out her own links with a broader activist culture – one that is global in nature. She is not the first to highlight these groups – Manuel Castells (XXXX) also identified that there are common links between the protesters in Egypt and the #Occupy movement that exploded globally shorlty thereafter. While the precise cause for protest may be different, Tufekci identifies what she describes as a global anti-authoritarian protest culture, with an emphasis on participation, horizontalism, instructional distrust, ad HOD organisation and a strong expressive bent (p. XXXX).
Tufekci argues that these movements cut across traditional political ideologies in ways that organised party politics struggles to deal with. These ‘networked protests’ have taken on ‘collective identities outside traditional political and social divisions’. The act of rebellion – and particularly that of occupying public land – has become part of an identity, or as Tufekci puts it, a ‘culture of protest’. This culture of protest has intersected with digital tools, and formed networks that persist over time and different locations. For Tufekci, this culture is linked to the development of the expressive side of protest. She argues that the success or failure of an activist movement can’t be entirely judged by its success in achieving political goals; rather, becoming part of a protest movement is a goal in and of itself. This expressive element is linked to the notions of horizontals and other participatory practices that spread throughout this culture, from Egypt to #Occupy in the United States.
As stated above, technology is central to these new networked cultures. Social movements would face real challenges in organising large groups of people without these digital technologies – although Tufekci is quick to point out that this doesn’t necessarily mean that it’s impossible to do so – just harder. Technology has helped to create new ways of organising and communicating, and this alters how we experience time and space – and also the repertoire of protest actions that are available to protesters. However, the technology itself did not cause the revolution, nor is it inherently good nor bad. Tufekci cites Kranzberg’s well known aphorism about technology being neither good nor bad, but nor is it neutral, as an example of the way that technology shapes our actions and experiences.
A good example of this that Tufekci discusses in detail is the way that networked communities and protests have largely come together in private spheres – like Facebook. These new privately owned spaces function as a new kind fo public sphere, with the caution that the owners still determine who and what is allowed access to this space – e.g. the gatekeeping by sovereign powers. There is no guarantee that private owerns will permit freedom of speech or organising – and indeed, there are network effects and algorithmic constraints to consider as well. Furthermore, these policies are often appleid inconsistently, when they are applied at all.
Another challenge is the way that technology shapes our perception and understanding of society’s norms. This is linked to the development of different reputations, and the networks effects associated with this can cause a chasm to open up between what is accepted in an online group when compared to wider societal norms. There are challenges related to anonymity, and speaking truth to power as well – especially in the form of organised campaigns, ‘pile-ons’ and doxxing. Finally, Tufkeci identifies that governments are in the process of exploring ways to fight back – including looking at new ways of censoring users. This new form is less about denial of access (although that is still an issue in some parts of the world) but more on the denial of attention, of focus and attacks on a person’s credibility.
Another crucial point
Challenge – growth, control, challenge from within, inaction
What does this mean for protest in Australia?
Opportunities
Not just online
Networked effects
Alternative uses – cute cats
Challenges
Trollling and Pile Ons
Censorship